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Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of market power on credit risk,
revenue diversification and bank stability in selected Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Thailand and Vietnam) using a sample of 153 commercial banks during
1998–2010. The authors find that bank market power is positively associated
with credit risk and revenue diversification. Nevertheless, these associations
diminished during the global financial crisis (GFC), implying that banks with
greater market power have been better able to manage their non-performing
loans during the crisis period. Bank stability, however, is not associated with
market power. Instead, it is found to be a negative function of state ownership,
asset composition and banking freedom. Overall, even though ASEAN banks
with greater market power have higher credit risk, they are more diversified,
thus leaving their overall bank risk unaffected.
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The Asian financial crisis (AFC), which originated in Thailand in July 1997, affected
the regional economies and destabilized their financial service industries. In partic-
ular, banks faced increased foreign debt as currencies were devalued, lenders lost
confidence in investing due to a sharp drop in savings, and fear of bankruptcy was
widespread. The initial priorities in dealing with the crisis were to alleviate fears
of financial system collapse and to restore confidence in economic management.
Specific measures were taken by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
member countries to restrict banks’ risk-taking behaviour and restructure their
respective banking systems. At the country level, emergency measures such as
the introduction of blanket guarantees and measures to deal with value-impaired
assets were introduced. These were accompanied by comprehensive bank restruc-
turing programmes supported by macroeconomic stabilization policies
(Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran, 2009).
Bank lending practice in ASEAN countries has traditionally relied on collateral
rather than credit assessment and cash flow analysis. Thus, banks were especially
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vulnerable to excessive risk taking and decline in asset values during the crisis
(Carl-Johan et al, 1999). For example, as credit growth slowed, banks were ex-
posed to high loan risk as their ability to be selective in lending was diminished.
Moreover, new loan contracts were influenced by sharply increasing non-per-
forming loans, loan-loss provisioning needs, declines in collateral values and eroding
capital bases (Corsetti et al, 1999).
The regulatory and restructuring measures undertaken during and after the AFC
focused primarily on discouraging banks from taking excessive credit risk, ensur-
ing banks reduced their exposure levels by diversifying revenue sources and
promoting the overall health of banks and their systems. Given this policy direc-
tion, this paper investigates, post-AFC, whether those ASEAN banks with greater
market power (1) have a lower credit risk, (2) earn higher non-interest income
from revenue diversification,1 and (3) have lower overall bank risk (hence, greater
stability). Investigating such impacts is important because market power should
help banks to ‘cherry-pick’ low-risk customers, identify new fee-based and com-
mission-based revenue growth opportunities and afford them greater bargaining
capacity in contract creation.
The current literature lacks clear and robust evidence on bank market power in
ASEAN countries and its impact on credit risk, revenue diversification and bank
risk. Such regional focus should prove important as ASEAN countries advance
intra-regional trade and economic agreements. Our sample, therefore, consists of
153 commercial banks operating in five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam). Based on initial data analysis and diag-
nostic testing, System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) estimators are
obtained for 1998–2010 capturing both AFC- and GFC-affected periods.
This paper contributes to the literature by gauging, for the first time, the ability
of ASEAN banks with greater market power to exploit the ex post AFC regulatory
focus and emphasis (lower credit risk, revenue diversification and lower overall
bank risk). This is achieved by utilizing annual bank-level market power proxies
(as derived by Turk-Ariss, 2010) in place of widely used industry-level competi-
tion measures which are assumed to be common to all banks in an industry in a
given period. Furthermore, multiple proxies are utilized in all models to ensure
the robustness of our findings.
The research issues addressed here are worthy of investigation for a number of
reasons. First, regulators can understand whether broader policy directives aimed
at ensuring improved bank risk management and revenue diversification should
accommodate bank-level market power differences in loan and deposit market
segments. Second, our findings should inform bankers and regulators of the
dichotomy between credit risk and overall bank risk, given bank revenue diversi-
fication strategies. Third, the regional focus of the analysis will help ASEAN in
future policy formulation involving credit risk, revenue diversification and over-
all bank risk, given the varying market power at bank level in the region.
The following section provides a brief review of related literature and derives
hypotheses from it.
1 By revenue diversification, we mean directing resources from traditional sources of interest rev-
enue (lending) and towards activities that generate fee income, commission income, trading revenue
and other types of non-interest income (Perera et al, 2010).
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Hypotheses
Previous work on bank market power and competition reflects two opposing views:
(1) ‘competition fragility’ and (2) ‘competition stability’. The former postulates
that more competition corrodes market power, decreases profit margins and re-
sults in reduced franchise value for banks (Berger et al, 2008; Demsetz and Strahan,
1997; Keely, 1990). Banks are therefore encouraged to reduce capital and/or in-
crease the average credit risk of their loan portfolios to maintain the expected
asset values. These measures increase the banks’ insolvency risk and threaten
financial system stability (Berger et al, 2009; Jimenez et al, 2010; Keely, 1990;
Schaeck et al, 2006). For example, Keely (1990) found that increased bank mar-
ket power and deregulation in the USA in the 1980s eroded monopoly rents and
resulted in a stream of bank failures. Similar results were observed in Spain where
bank market power was associated with a higher-risk loan portfolio (Jimenez et
al, 2010). Hellmann et al (2000) observe bank ‘moral hazard’ behaviour when
interest ceilings on deposit are removed, while Agoraki et al (2011) show that
non-performing loans decrease with a rise in the degree of bank market power in
loan markets.
In contrast, the ‘competition-stability’ view argues that greater market power
(resulting from less competitive markets) increases bank risk due to higher lend-
ing rates (Beck et al, 2006). These inflated loan prices make it harder for borrowers
to repay, and instead encourage investing in riskier projects (Boyd and De Nicolo,
2006). Also, due to adverse selection, higher risks may result due to the select set
of borrowers. Schaeck et al (2006) show that more competitive banking systems
have a lower probability of failure, are more stable and have longer distances to
default. They find that non-performing loans decrease with a rise of market power
in the loan market, thus promoting financial stability.
Alternatively, Berger et al (2009) have investigated this research proposition
using a sample of 8,255 banks from 23 developed nations, and suggest a U-shaped
relationship between market power and bank stability. Accordingly, even if less
market power results in a riskier set of loans, overall bank risk may not increase.
Through application of risk mitigation techniques (such as increasing equity capi-
tal, sales of loans, sales of credit derivatives, etc), a bank can still choose a lower
overall risk for itself while maintaining a riskier loan portfolio associated with
higher lending rates. Liu et al (2012) provide European evidence that through
sustainable risk mitigation tools, overall risk level can be managed.
We argue that Berger et al’s (2009) findings may not be applicable in develop-
ing ASEAN banking markets. For example, banks in ASEAN countries are subject
to close supervision by respective central banks, and most of the larger, dominant
banks are state-owned. These dominant banks are ‘protected’ from direct compe-
tition through discriminatory policies against foreign banks (Mohamed and Luc,
2009), and may therefore have the endemic ability to cherry-pick low-risk cus-
tomers. Thus, given these competitive dynamics, to the extent that ASEAN banks
with market power cherry-pick credit risk, we expect a negative association between
bank market power and bank credit risk. The formal hypothesis is stated as fol-
lows:
H1: Bank market power is inversely associated with credit risk after control-
ling for other bank-specific and external characteristics.
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Moreover, we argue that market power affords banks greater bargaining capacity
in contract creation and helps identify new fee-based and commission-based rev-
enue growth opportunities. Previous research (Deyoung and Roland, 2001; Lepetit
et al, 2008a) has found that market power leads to changes in banks’ income
structure by reducing the importance of their traditional business lines. Authors
assert that banks’ emphasis on non-interest income is inevitable due to deregula-
tion and the need to manage exposure levels. Other extant work focuses on the
association between non-interest income and bank size (Deyoung and Roland,
2001; Rogers and Sinkey, 1999), net interest margins (Lepetit et al, 2008b), bank
technology (Carbó and Fernández, 2007; Deyoung and Roland, 2001) and effi-
ciency (Lozano and Pasiouras, 2010).
The existing works are, however, silent on the association between bank mar-
ket power and revenue diversification in ASEAN countries. Arguably, revenue
diversification prospects may be relatively restricted due to the lack of fee and
commission-based products and the strict regulatory environment in ASEAN coun-
tries. Despite this, we anticipate a positive association between market power (in
traditional loan and deposit markets) and revenue diversification, to the extent
that the former helps banks to exploit new and existing non-interest income-gen-
erating opportunities (Baele et al, 2007; Nguyen et al, 2012b). Thus, the formal
hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Bank market power is positively associated with revenue diversification
after controlling for other bank-specific and external characteristics.
Two previous studies by Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh (2008) and Soedarmono et
al (2011) investigate the effect of market power on bank stability in selected Asian
countries. Both find that bank market power does not erode bank stability. We
reinvestigate the issue because the methods utilized in those studies did not con-
sider possible endogeneity issues, and also their sample did not cover both AFC
and GFC periods. Thus, to the extent that market power helps banks to cherry-
pick low-risk loans (Liu et al, 2011) and exploit existing opportunities to diversify
their revenue sources, then such dominant banks should be characterized by greater
stability (Liu et al, 2012). Therefore, we expect a positive association between
market power and bank stability. The formal hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Market power is positively associated with bank stability after controlling
for other bank-specific and external characteristics.
The following section details sample selection and empirical methods utilized to
test the three hypotheses mentioned above.
Sample
The sample consists of 153 commercial banks operating in five ASEAN countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) over the period 1998–
2010.2 We exclude investment banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and other
non-bank financial intermediaries (insurance companies, mortgage houses, etc),
2 The other five ASEAN members are excluded: Singapore due to accounting report date mis-
match; Cambodia due to prohibitions on non-interest income activities (Barth et al, 2009) and
Brunei, Laos and Myanmar due to lack of bank-specific data.
Market power in selected ASEAN countries 403
since they are subject to different regulatory requirements from those applied to
commercial banks (Perera et al, 2007). In the case of mergers and acquisitions,
we treat targets and acquirers separately as long as data are reported separately. If
a non-bank acquirer is involved and unconsolidated data are not available after a
merger, then the target firm is excluded from the sample (Nguyen et al, 2012a).
To avoid survivorship bias, unbalanced bank-specific panel data are used to cover
as many banks as possible within the sample period.
The sample is constructed using several data sources. Unconsolidated bank-
level data are taken from the BankScope database published by Fitch Ratings and
Bureau van Dijk. The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is collected from the
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.
There were 272 licensed commercial banks listed in central bank annual reports
of the selected countries as of December 2010. BankScope, however, only covers
253 commercial banks. The sample is also filtered by excluding 68 banks with
fewer than three consecutive yearly observations (Nguyen et al, 2012b) or when
data on major variables (such as non-performing loans, share of non-interest in-
come and off-balance-sheet activities) are not available. Among these 68 banks,
54 are foreign bank branches operating in ASEAN countries. These banks do not
produce separate detailed financial statements, and only consolidate their results
with parent companies. A further 32 banks whose reporting dates were different
from the majority in the sample were deleted. Thus, our final sample consists of
153 commercial banks.
Table 1 summarizes the composition of the sample by country and ownership
form. Of the 153 banks included in the final sample, Indonesia has the largest
number, accounting for 43.79% of the total, followed by Vietnam (17.64%),
Malaysia (16.99%), Thailand (13.72%) and the Philippines (7.84%). In terms of
ownership forms, the majority of sample banks in all five countries are domestically
Table 1. Sample selection and breakdown by country and ownership form.
Panel A: Sample selection
Number
Total number of licensed commercial banks in selected ASEAN countries 272
Exclude: banks without unconsolidated data in BankScope 19
Exclude: banks without data for three consecutive years 68
Exclude: banks with mismatched reporting dates 32
Final sample of banks 153
Total bank-year observations 1,877
Panel B: Breakdown of banks by country and ownership form
Country Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Number of banks  67  26  12  21      27
State-owned 3 0 1 2 3
Privately owned 64 26 11 19 24
Foreign-owned 16 13 6 6 0
Domestically owned 51 13 6 15 27
Listed 22 5 8 10 2
Not listed 45 21 4 11 25
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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and privately owned. Overall, the sample consists of 1,877 bank-year observa-
tions.
Empirical model
To estimate the effects of market power on credit risk, revenue diversification and
bank stability, we employ Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators
consistent with Berger et al (2009) and Schaeck et al (2006). The Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg tests show that variables are heteroskedastic since their variances
are not constant over time. Thus, we employed White diagonal standard errors
adjustment (White, 1980) to correct the p-values obtained from GMM regres-
sions. Our approach is more efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS), since it
accounts for heteroskedasticity and does not require distributional assumptions
on the error terms (Hall, 2005).
While constructing our model, we consider the possible effects among three
dependent variables (credit risk, revenue diversification and overall bank risk),
and hence, use them in a system of equations. To illustrate, overall bank risk is a
partial function of credit risk (along with various other types of risks including
liquidity risk, funding risk, portfolio risk, etc). Likewise, fee and commission
income can bring diversification benefits, thereby impacting on bank stability.
Thus, to account for the intra-effects among these three dependent variables, we
employ system GMM following Ataullah and Le (2006). The specific model is
given below, while Table 2 defines its variables:
Q
Σ
q=1
Yijt = α0 + βMPijt + ρ(AFC * MPijt) + σ(GFC * MPijt) +
N
Σ
n=1
γkBn +
X
Σ
x=1
δpCx + εijt ,
(1)
where subscripts i denote individual banks, j countries, t time horizon and q, n
and x index the variables Y, B and C respectively. Y is the vector of dependent
variables that represents non-performing loans (NPL) for H1, share on non-inter-
est income (NII/TI) for H2, and Z-index for H3. The intercept α is a constant, and
MP represents bank market power; the Lerner index (CLL and FLL) and bank
size (SIZE) are used as proxies for market power. Bank-specific and country-
specific variables are denoted by two vectors, B and C respectively. AFC and
GFC are two dummy variables representing the two crisis-affected periods. β, ρ,
σ, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated and ε denotes a random error term. Two
interaction terms (AFC * MP) and (GFC * MP) are included to capture how the
association between bank market power and the dependent variables has changed
during AFC- and GFC-affected periods respectively.
We utilize the ratio of loan loss provision to loans (NPL) as a proxy for credit
risk (Rogers and Sinkey, 1999). The ratio of non-interest income to total income
(NII/TI) is used as a proxy for revenue diversification (Maudos and Fernández,
2004). The Z-index, which combines leverage, profitability and profit volatility,
is employed as the measure of bank stability (Berger et al, 2009; Boyd et al, 2006;
De Nicolo and Loukoianova, 2007) and is calculated as follows:
EROAi + —–TAiZi = —————— , (2)σROAi
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where ROAi represents period-average return on assets for bank i, E/TA is the
period-average equity to total assets ratio for bank i and σROA is the standard de-
viation of return on assets (ROA) for bank i.
Measure of bank market power
We utilize the Lerner index as the proxy for bank market power (Nguyen et al,
2012b; Turk-Ariss, 2010), which is more informative than market concentration
measures (Jimenez et al, 2010; Maudos and Fernández, 2004). It captures the
deviation of price from a bank’s marginal cost and is computed as follows:
(Pit – MCit)Lernerit = ————– , (3)Pit
where P is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenues to total
assets and MC is the marginal cost of total assets. MC is derived using Berger et al
(2009) and Turk-Ariss (2010) methodology.
In addition to Lerner indices, we utilize bank size (SIZE) (Berger et al, 2009;
Mohamed and Luc, 2009; Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh, 2008; Ruby and Opiela,
2000; Todd et al, 1999; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007) as a proxy for market
power. It is argued that bank size is an alternative measure of bank market power
since, the larger a bank, the more powerful it usually is.3 To the extent that size
reflects bank dominance and the ability to be selective in a lending market (Schaeck
et al, 2006), SIZE reflects market power.
Control variables
Based on the existing literature, asset composition (AC) (Ahmad et al, 2008; Beck
et al, 2006; Binici et al, 2010; Boyd et al, 2006; Jacques, 2008; Laeven and Levine,
2009; Stijn and Laeven, 2004), state ownership dummy (SO) (Berger et al, 2008,
2009; Cole, 2009; Haselmann et al, 2009; Lu et al, 2012; Luo et al, 2011), foreign
ownership dummy (FO) (Berger et al, 2009; Bertus et al, 2008; Epstein, 2011;
Gormley, 2010; Lee et al, 2011; Lensink et al, 2008), banking freedom (BF) (Nguyen
et al, 2012b; Santiago et al, 2009) and corruption level (CS) (Barth et al, 2009;
Weill, 2011) are utilized as control variables in Equation (1). We also include two
additional dummy variables to capture the effects of Asian (AFC) and global (GFC)
financial crises.
With regard to NPL (associated with H1), foreign ownership dummy (FO), bank-
ing freedom (BF) and corruption level (CS) are expected to have negative
coefficients. Foreign banks should be exposed to lower NPLs due to their supe-
rior credit assessment, monitoring capacity and operational independence (Berger
et al, 2009; Bertus et al, 2008). BF indicates the banking system’s openness to
foreign bank entry and operations as well as governments’ influence over bank
asset allocation. Greater banking freedom (BF) means more operational flexibil-
ity in loan contract creation, resulting in lower non-performing assets (Mercieca
et al, 2007). Likewise, more corruption (that is, lower CS values)4 will lead to
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insightful addition to our work.
4 Corruption score (CS) signifies the transparency of competitive atmosphere where the banks
operate. This index sketches a country’s overall level of accountability and trustworthiness to-
wards a sound financial system where higher values indicate less corruption (Pasiouras, 2008).
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bank inefficiency, thereby increasing NPLs (Jacobson and Roszbach, 2003). Co-
efficients of asset composition (AC) and state ownership (SO) are expected to be
positive. The greater the exposure to loan assets (AC, measured as the ratio of
loans to total assets), the higher the expected loan losses (NPL measured as the
ratio of non-performing loans to total assets) (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Peek and
Rosengren, 1995).
With regard to the association between control variables and revenue diversifi-
cation (NII/TI, associated with H2), the following a priori expectations are put
forward. Positive coefficients are expected for state ownership (SO) and banking
freedom (BF) variables. State-owned banks (SO) have better opportunities to di-
versify due to government support and sponsorship, and this is particularly true in
ASEAN where regulators responded to the AFC by nationalizing banks (Williams
and Nguyen, 2005). State-owned banks may also be forced to lend to certain sec-
tors or industries to fulfil political objectives, rather than solely on commercial
grounds (Sapienza, 2002). Their customer base is, therefore, relatively larger than
that of privately owned banks, possibly resulting in higher non-interest income.
Greater banking freedom (BF) will encourage banks to operate freely in the mar-
ket, thus providing enhanced scope for revenue diversification (Mercieca et al,
2007). It is expected that more banking freedom enables banks to be more diver-
sified (Lepetit et al, 2008b). In contrast, negative coefficients are expected for
asset composition (AC) and AFC and GFC dummy variables. Banks with higher
loans to total assets ratios (AC) should have lower shares of non-interest income,
since their resource allocation is skewed towards interest income (Ruby and Opiela,
2000). To the extent that banks refocus and concentrate on their core lending
function during crisis periods, AFC and GFC should be negatively associated
with NII/TI.
With regard to bank stability (Z-index, associated with H3), the foreign owner-
ship dummy (FO) and corruption level (CS) are expected to have negative
coefficients. Lower corruption will promote greater bank stability. Positive coef-
ficients are expected for state ownership (SO) and banking freedom (BF) variables.
More banking freedom will enhance possibilities to adopt various risk mitigation
methods to foster stability.
The following section reports and discusses the key findings that have been
obtained from model estimation.
Results
The correlation matrix for regression variables utilized in Equation (1) is pro-
vided in Table 3. The regression results pertaining to H1
, 
H2
 
and H3 are presented
in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Bank market power is proxied by the conventional Lerner
index (CLL) in Table 4, fund-adjusted Lerner index (FLL) in Table 5, and bank
size (SIZE) in Table 6. The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity
using White diagonal standard errors adjustment (White, 1980).
Association between bank market power and credit risk
Our consistent results indicate that ASEAN banks with more market power had
greater credit risks. This is evident in positive and significant coefficients obtained
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (continued on next page).
NPL ZI NII/TI CLL FLL SIZE AFCCLL GFCCLL
NPL 1 –0.2244 –0.1810 0.1563 –0.1831 0.1665 0.1534 –0.0596
ZI –0.2465 1 0.1321 0.0302 0.0809 –0.3172 0.0698 0.1089
NII/TI –0.0579 0.1030 1 –0.0093 0.1703 –0.1752 –0.0217 0.0136
CLL 0.1619 0.0264 –0.1065 1 0.7052 0.3378 0.1355 0.3201
FLL –0.0676 0.0668 0.0183 0.6811 1 0.4563 0.0716 0.2090
SIZE 0.1253 –0.3678 –0.0734 0.2191 0.3846 1 –0.2306 –0.0047
AFCCLL 0.2000 0.0394 –0.0118 0.0140 –0.1152 –0.1082 1 –0.0524
GFCCLL 0.1275 0.0837 –0.1979 0.2761 –0.0648 0.1170 –0.0845 1
AFCFLL 0.2015 0.0366 –0.0123 0.0133 –0.1147 –0.1075 0.9998 –0.0848
GFCFLL –0.2629 0.1781 0.1325 –0.1267 0.2111 –0.0506 –0.1546 0.5074
AFCSIZE 0.0316 0.0750 –0.0105 0.0480 –0.0398 –0.1539 0.4843 –0.0275
GFCSIZE 0.1369 0.0477 –0.2022 0.1128 –0.1932 0.0793 –0.0300 0.6515
AC –0.0160 –0.2735 –0.0848 –0.0705 –0.0900 0.1188 –0.1091 0.0348
SO 0.0705 –0.1926 –0.1319 –0.0631 –0.0811 0.2243 –0.0283 0.0262
FO –0.0124 –0.1119 –0.2226 0.0936 0.2300 0.0563 –0.0416 0.0597
BF 0.1408 –0.2787 0.0301 –0.2945 –0.3230 0.4206 0.0855 0.1934
CS 0.0004 –0.0799 0.0708 –0.5747 –0.7079 0.4535 0.1817 0.0291
Note: The top right diagonal reports Spearman correlation matrix and the lower left diagonal
reports Pearson correlation matrix. NPL = non-performing loan, ZI = Z-index, NII/TI = non-
interest income/total income, CLL = conventional Lerner, FLL = fund-adjusted Lerner, SIZE =
bank size, AFC = Asian financial crisis, GFC = global financial crisis, AFCCLL = (AFC*CLL),
GFCCLL = (GFC*CLL), AFCFLL = (AFC*FLL), GFCFLL = (GFC*FLL), AFCSIZE =
(AFC*SIZE), GFCSIZE = (GFC*SIZE), AC = asset composition, SO = state-owned banks, FO =
foreign-owned banks, BF = banking freedom, CS = corruption score.
for all market power proxies (CLL: column 1, Table 4; FLL: column 1, Table 5;
and SIZE: column 1, Table 6), indicating that dominant banks with greater market
power had risky loan portfolios. Thus, H1 is not supported.
However, this observed positive association between bank market power and
credit risk has diminished during the GFC period, implying that banks with more
market power have performed better in recovering non-performing loans. This is
evidenced by the negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) coeffi-
cients for (GFC*conventional Lerner), (GFC*fund Lerner) and (GFC*bank size)
variables (column 1, Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively). This seems to be a lesson
dominant banks have learnt following large loan losses incurred during the AFC,
as reflected by AFC interaction variables (AFC*conventional Lerner) and
(AFC*fund Lerner).
One of the reasons behind such losses may be the higher unavoidable fixed
costs associated with the lending process, which banks failed to manage during
the AFC (Okuda and Hashimoto, 2004). Our findings are consistent with Okuda
and Hashimoto (2004), who showed that during the AFC, economies of scale did
exist for larger banks with more market power.
Not surprisingly, banks with greater exposure to loan assets (as reflected in
loans to total assets ratio (AC)) have more loan losses. Similar findings have been
reported by Bikker and Haaf (2002). Banking systems characterized by less cor-
ruption (reflected in higher values for CS variable) have lower credit risk and loan
losses. Arguably, this signifies the high loan risk that results due to distortions
introduced by politically driven loan provisions and channelling of funds (Barth
et al, 2009; Weill, 2011).
Consistent results are also obtained for FO variables. Compared with their
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AFCFLL GFCFLL AFCSIZE GFCSIZE AC SO FO BF CS
0.1482 –0.3994 0.0667 0.3788 0.4452 0.0702 –0.0016 0.1674 0.0733
0.0540 0.1618 0.0224 0.0223 –0.1958 –0.2058 –0.1040 –0.2433 0.0095
–0.0192 0.1712 –0.0271 –0.2259 0.0862 –0.1060 –0.1619 0.0029 0.0441
0.1545 –0.0264 0.0396 0.2719 –0.0636 –0.0904 0.0801 –0.3203 –0.5388
0.1089 0.3886 0.0095 –0.2462 –0.0255 –0.1448 0.1523 –0.3283 –0.6505
–0.2364 –0.1031 –0.0955 –0.0068 0.1219 0.2170 0.0497 0.4018 0.4075
0.9831 –0.0841 0.3862 0.0723 –0.0769 –0.0501 –0.0124 –0.0535 0.0523
–0.0415 0.7138 0.0538 0.2524 –0.0789 –0.0307 0.0454 0.1533 –0.1059
1 –0.0714 0.3715 0.0725 –0.0750 –0.0429 0.0026 –0.0831 0.0065
–0.1549 1 0.0259 –0.3050 –0.0255 –0.1010 0.0561 0.0914 –0.1230
0.4807 –0.0619 1 0.1206 –0.0742 –0.0276 –0.0254 –0.0133 0.0449
–0.0302 0.1668 –0.0016 1 –0.0818 0.0303 0.0596 0.0595 0.0054
–0.1071 0.0460 –0.1861 0.0327 1 0.0222 0.0708 0.1465 0.0631
–0.0270 –0.0779 –0.0737 0.0077 –0.0309 1 0.1676 0.0662 –0.0383
–0.0415 0.0682 –0.1191 0.0448 0.0425 0.1676 1 –0.0024 –0.4032
0.0855 0.2106 –0.0185 0.0919 0.3220 0.0607 0.0068 1 0.4450
0.1805 0.0483 0.0990 0.0566 0.1583 –0.0023 –0.3050 0.5364 1
domestically owned counterparts, foreign-owned banks have lower non-perform-
ing loans. Arguably, foreign banks are exposed to lower NPLs due to their superior
credit assessment, monitoring capacity and operational independence (Epstein,
2011; Lensink et al, 2008; Saunders et al, 1990). These results are also consistent
with the ‘global advantage hypothesis’ (Berger and Hannan, 1998), which posits
that foreign institutions with better practice and superior managerial skills are
able to overcome any cross-border disadvantages and operate abroad more effi-
ciently than domestic institutions.
The significant positive coefficients for banking freedom (BF) indicate that more
operational flexibility in loan contract creation resulted in higher non-performing
loans. Liu et al (2011) report similar findings for the European banking market.
State ownership (SO) has insignificant coefficients. The coefficients for SO may
be driven by the fact that most large banks in ASEAN countries are state-owned.
Thus, state ownership may already be accounted for by the scale variable (SIZE).
Association between bank market power and revenue diversification
Our estimations present positive and statistically significant coefficients for all
market power proxies (CLL, FLL and SIZE respectively in column 2, Tables 4, 5
and 6) and provide strong support for H2. These findings indicate that market
power in loan and deposit markets helps ASEAN banks to exploit growth oppor-
tunities in non-traditional markets, which in turn leads to higher income share
from fee- and commission-based banking products. Our results are consistent with
previous studies (Deyoung and Roland, 2001; Lepetit et al, 2008b), which found
that increases in market power led to changes in banks’ income structure by re-
ducing the importance of their traditional business lines. Put differently, increasing
bank market power in deposit and loan markets encourages banks to diversify
their income-generating activities (Nguyen et al, 2012b).
Interestingly, this positive association has diminished during the GFC period.
This is evident in the negative and statistically significant coefficients for
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Table 4. System GMM estimates, using conventional Lerner as the proxy for market power.
Credit risk Revenue diversification Bank stability
1 2 3
Constant –2.5213*** 0.0001 0.4911***
Conventional Lerner (CLL) 0.3051*** 0.0048*** –0.2278
AFC*conventional Lerner 0.6212*** 0.0061*** 0.0014**
GFC*conventional Lerner –0.1034*** –0.0015*** 0.0092**
State-owned (SO) 0.1282 –0.0087** –0.0020***
Foreign-owned (FO) –0.2488* –0.0007*** –0.2703
Asset composition (AC) 0.7536*** 0.0059* –0.0143***
Banking freedom (BF) 0.0113*** 0.0001 –0.0023***
Corruption score (CS) –0.0245*** 0.0002** 0.0020
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.05 0.12
No of observations 1,877 1,877 1,877
Note: This table presents the system GMM estimates for selected ASEAN banks during 1998–
2010 from the following model:
Q
Σ
q=1
Yijt = α0 + βMPijt + ρ(AFC * MPijt) + σ(GFC * MPijt) +
N
Σ
n=1
γkBn +
X
Σ
x=1
δpCx + ειjt ,
where, subscripts i denote individual banks, j countries, t time horizon. Y represents a vector of
dependent variables (non-performing loans, revenue diversification and bank stability); and α is a
constant, MP is the proxy for market power (conventional Lerner), B and C are vectors of bank-
specific and country-specific variables, AFC and GFC are two dummy variables representing the
two crisis-affected periods. β, ρ, σ, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated and ε denotes the
random error term. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively.
Table 5. System GMM estimates, using fund Lerner as the proxy for market power.
Credit risk Revenue diversification Bank stability
1 2 3
Constant –1.1902*** –0.0054 1.6966***
Fund Lerner (FLL) 0.7487** 0.0009** –0.0382
AFC*fund Lerner 0.9579*** 0.0072*** –0.0089
GFC*fund Lerner –0.5830*** –0.0032 0.0537
State-owned (SO) 0.0290 –0.0099 –0.0059
Foreign-owned (FO) –0.6664** –0.0024 –0.3173
Asset composition (AC) 0.9893*** 0.0064 –0.0240
Banking freedom (BF) 0.0188*** 0.0007 –0.0013
Corruption score (CS) –0.0018 0.0009*** 0.0053
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.10 0.12
No of observations 1,877 1,877 1,877
Note: This table presents the system GMM estimates for selected ASEAN banks during 1998–2010
from the following model:
Q
Σ
q=1
Yijt = α0 + βMPijt + ρ(AFC * MPijt) + σ(GFC * MPijt) +
N
Σ
n=1
γkBn +
X
Σ
x=1
δpCx + ειjt ,
where subscripts i denote individual banks, j countries, t time horizon. Y represents vectors of
dependent variables (non-performing loans, stability and revenue diversification); α is a constant,
MP is the proxy for market power (fund Lerner), B and C are vectors of bank-specific and country-
specific variables, AFC and GFC are two dummy variables representing the two crisis-affected
periods. β, ρ, σ, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated and ε denotes the random error term. ***, **
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(GFC*conventional Lerner), (GFC*fund Lerner) and (GFC*bank size) variables
(in column 2, Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively). Given the heightened uncertainty
and turmoil in global financial markets during this period, ASEAN banks have
apparently refocused on the core interest-based lending market.
We also find that large banks earn a higher share of non-interest income, which
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is consistent with results obtained by Lepetit et al (2008b). This is also compat-
ible with our results for H2, since large banks are usually the ones with greater
market power. Also, greater banking freedom (BF) helps ASEAN banks to diver-
sify their revenue sources and earn a higher share of fee and commission income.
The coefficient for FO confirms Acharya et al’s (2006) finding that foreign-owned
banks are more likely to experience competitive disadvantages relative to local
banks.
Association between market power and bank stability
Our results present statistically insignificant coefficients for CLL, FLL and SIZE
(in column 3, Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively), suggesting that bank market power
is not associated with overall bank risk in ASEAN countries. Put differently, we
do not find significant evidence of association between market power and bank
stability in these banking markets. Hence, H3 is not supported.
This explains that, despite increases in market power and their effect on credit
risk, the overall bank risk does not necessarily need to rise. As Berger et al (2009)
suggest, banks with market power can protect their franchise value from higher
loan risk using other risk mitigation strategies. A higher value for the Z-index
may come from either more capital or higher earnings, which indicate more financial
stability, while greater unpredictability in earnings reduces the Z-index and hence
increases the bank’s overall risk (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2006). Interestingly, our
results indicate that, during the GFC, ASEAN banks were relatively more stable.
This is evident in the statistically significant positive coefficients for
(GFC*conventional Lerner), (GFC*fund Lerner) and (GFC*bank size) in column
3 of Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
Table 6. System GMM estimates, using bank size as the proxy for market power.
Credit risk Revenue diversification Bank stability
1 2 3
Constant –3.0465*** 0.0193*** 1.1784***
Bank size (SIZE) 0.5122** 0.0322*** –0.6263
AFC*bank size 0.0673* –0.0057** –0.0297
GFC*bank size –0.0207*** –0.0089*** 0.0026***
State-owned (SO) 0.3741 –0.0103** –0.5514***
Foreign-owned (FO) –0.7197*** 0.0012** 0.2123
Asset composition (AC) 0.7092*** 0.0062 –0.0626***
Banking freedom (BF) 0.0086** 0.0001 –0.0007***
Corruption score (CS) –0.0076** 0.0005** 0.0011***
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.05 0.12
No of observations 1,422 1,422 1,422
Note: This table presents the system GMM estimates for selected ASEAN banks during 1998–
2010 from the following model:
Q
Σ
q=1
Yijt = α0 + βMPijt + ρ(AFC * MPijt) + σ(GFC * MPijt) +
N
Σ
n=1
γkBn +
X
Σ
x=1
δpCx + ειjt ,
where subscripts i denote individual banks, j countries, t time horizon. Y represents vectors of
dependent variables: that is, non-performing loans, stability and revenue diversification; α is a
constant, MP is the proxy for market power (bank size), B and C are vectors of bank-specific and
country-specific variables, AFC and GFC are two dummy variables representing the two crisis-
affected periods. β, ρ, σ, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated and ε denotes the random error
term. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Interestingly, state-owned banks have a shorter distance to failure than their
privately owned counterparts. This is so despite the fact that the former operate
under government sponsorship and are protected by various policies and guaran-
tees. Banking freedom (BF) inversely affects bank stability, and this finding is
consistent with Stijn and Laeven (2004). Arguably, this is so because more bank-
ing freedom may encourage banks to reach suboptimal risk–return combinations
due to lack of supervision (Beck et al, 2006).
Robustness tests
For the purpose of robustness, we perform several tests. To capture the possible
changes in size effects during the crisis periods, we use the growth rate of bank
size (GRSZ) as an alternative proxy for market power.5 The results are available
upon request from the authors. Those ASEAN banks with increased growth in
size were found to be more stable, yet these banks had lower engagement in rev-
enue diversification activities. This implies that such banks had expanded their
core lending activities to sustain stability, instead of focusing on revenue diversi-
fication.
We include the bank’s total equity to total assets ratio (EQUITY) as a bank-
level control variable in Equation (1).6 The expected sign of this variable is not
determined a priori. On the one hand, the negative relationship is documented by
Lepetit et al (2008a), who find that market power allows banks to enjoy relatively
lower costs of capital. On the other hand, consumers may view banks with a lower
capital ratio as ‘too risky’ and seek ‘less risky’ ones to transact business in non-
traditional markets (Lepetit et al, 2008b; Rogers and Sinkey, 1999). The findings
further confirm our main regression results for H1
,
 H2 and H3
.
Also, we tested our results by including ratio of total cost to total income ratio
(EFFICIENCY) instead of asset composition.7 Our findings for EFFICIENCY
confirm a well managed bank’s ability to reduce costs and associated risks by
improving its earnings capability (Elsas et al, 2010). The results for the three
hypotheses remain consistent.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated whether those ASEAN banks with greater market
power (1) have lower credit risk, (2) earn higher non-interest income from rev-
enue diversification, and (3) have greater stability (lower overall bank risk). The
sample consisted of 153 commercial banks operating in five ASEAN countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam). System General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators were obtained for 1998–2010,
including the periods affected by the AFC and GFC.
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insightful comment. In Equation (1), we utilized
(AFC*GRSZ) and (GFC*GRSZ) to capture the impact of crises when we used growth rate of
bank size as a proxy for market power.
6 Due to high Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values between EQUITY and SIZE, we excluded
EQUITY from our main regressions.
7 Due to high Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values between EFFICIENCY and AC, we excluded
EFFICIENCY from our main regressions.
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It is found that ASEAN bank market power is positively associated with credit
risk (higher NPLs) and hence H1 is not supported
.
 Banks with greater market
power incurred greater loan losses during AFC-affected periods, but managed to
avoid the same during the GFC. This finding suggests that dominant banks had
more sustainable and less risky loan portfolios during GFC-affected periods. Ar-
guably, these low loan losses were driven by these banks’ ability to cherry-pick
low-risk loan contracts. Also, compared with domestically owned counterparts,
foreign-owned ones had lower non-performing loans. Our findings support the
argument that foreign banks are exposed to lower NPLs due to their superior credit
assessment, monitoring capacity and operational independence.
We found strong support for H2 – that market power in loan and deposit mar-
kets helps ASEAN banks to earn a higher share of income from fee-based and
commission-based banking products. Our results indicate that increases in market
power lead to changes in banks’ income structure by reducing the importance of
their traditional business lines. Interestingly, ASEAN banks with greater market
power had lower non-interest income shares (ratio of non-interest income to total
income) during the GFC-affected period. Given the heightened uncertainty and
turmoil in global financial markets during this period, ASEAN banks have refocused
on the core interest-based lending market.
Our results do not support H3
 
– that market power is positively associated with
overall bank stability. Despite lack of support for H3, bank stability is found to be
a negative function of state ownership, asset composition and banking freedom.
Interestingly, state-owned banks are unstable and have a shorter distance to fail-
ure than their privately owned counterparts.
From a cross-country perspective, banks operating under more freedom have
(1) higher credit risk (and NPLs), (2) a higher share of fee- and commission-
based income, and (3) greater overall bank risk. Arguably, the latter is so because
more banking freedom on activities encourages banks to invest in risky asset port-
folios, thereby increasing the possibilities of higher NPL and overall risk.
Our findings for H1 imply that banks with greater market power should be
more selective in core lending practices. This will help them to control the on-
balance-sheet default risk arising out of less creditworthy borrowers. With the
results obtained for H2, if banks choose to be selective in lending, they can diver-
sify their revenue to offset any loss of income due to reduced lending activities.
Finally, findings for H3
 
imply that policies and practices aimed at better manag-
ing credit risk per se do not ensure lower levels of overall bank risk (higher bank
stability).
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